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Aircraft electrification requires novel designs to supply the growing demand for electric 
power on-board through efficient and reliable production and distribution of electrical 
energy. Moreover, the aircraft power system will be a key enabler for the integration of future 
technologies. Pledging to these intentions, we propose a formulation to synthesize a power 
system architecture that complies with safety specifications following a Platform Based Design 
methodology that optimizes the main aerospace drivers. Due to the non-linear nature of the 
design problem, this paper presents reliability based MILP network design formulations for 
topology synthesis. The novelty of this approach relies in the adoption of network design 
optimization for MEA power system construction that allows explicit design formulations as 
MILP problems. This approach will provide an effective way to include safety specifications 
by introducing reliability and resiliency constraints. 
Nomenclature 
 
Sets 
ℊ   = set of available generators  
ℰ   = set of available distribution paths (generator – load connections)  
𝒩   = set of available distribution components  
𝒜   = set of available connections between distribution components  
𝐾   = set of selected distribution paths (generator – load connections), 𝐾 ⊆ ℰ  
𝐹   = set of failure scenarios   
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Generator Selection and Generator-Load Pairing 
𝒢 = (ℊ, ℰ)  = graph containing set of generators ℊ and distribution paths ℰ 
𝑤𝑠, 𝜂𝑠, 𝛽𝑠, 𝑃𝑠
𝐺 , ?̂?𝑠
𝐺
  = weight, efficiency, loading, power rating, and power supplied for generator 𝑠 
𝐿𝑙 , 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙    = load demand and reliability target for load 𝑙  
𝑔𝑠   = Boolean selection for generator 𝑠  
𝑦𝑠𝑙    = Boolean selection for distribution path that connects generator 𝑠 with load 𝑙  
𝑟𝑉𝑆, 𝑟𝑠𝑙   = reliability of distribution system or path that connects generator 𝑠 with load 𝑙  
𝑢𝑠ℎ, 𝑧𝑠ℎ,𝑏   = weight and efficiency linearization Boolean variables  
𝑤ℎ , 𝜂ℎ𝑏
LOSS   = weight and efficiency linearization coefficients  
 
Power Distribution Design 
𝒢 = (𝒩, 𝒜) = graph containing set of components 𝒩 and connections 𝒜 
𝑘, 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘   = distribution path (𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑘 ∈ ℰ), reliability target for distribution path 𝑘  
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘, 𝑃𝑖,𝑘  = power flow on connection 𝑖, 𝑗 and component 𝑖 for distribution path 𝑘   
𝑐𝑖𝑗 , 𝑚𝑖   = fixed cost coefficient for connection 𝑖, 𝑗; fixed cost for component 𝑖  
𝑐𝑖𝑗
kW, 𝑚𝑖
kW   = variable cost coefficient for connection 𝑖, 𝑗; variable cost for component 𝑖  
𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑣𝑖   = Boolean selection for connection 𝑖, 𝑗 and component 𝑖 
𝑟𝑖𝑗 , 𝑟𝑖   = reliability of connection 𝑖, 𝑗, reliability of component 𝑖   
𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 , 𝑑𝑘
𝐺𝐸𝑁   = load demand and power generation of the distribution path 𝑘     
𝓏𝑖𝑗,𝑘 , 𝓏𝑖,𝑘   = Boolean variables to associate connection 𝑖, 𝑗, component 𝑖 with distribution path 𝑘  
 𝒻, 𝒻𝑖𝑗   = failure case 𝒻 ∈ 𝐹, failure of connection 𝑖, 𝑗    
𝑞   = disjoint path that belongs to distribution path 𝑘, 𝑞 ∈ {1, 2}     
𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘, 𝓊𝑖,𝑘   = Boolean that enforces disjointess on paths 𝑞 for 𝑘 in connection 𝑖, 𝑗, component 𝑖     
𝓈𝑖,𝑘
𝑞
   = probability of successfully reaching component 𝑖 while on paths 𝑞 for 𝑘      
ℴ𝑎𝑏,𝑘   = Boolean variable to select two disjoint-path reliability for path 𝑘        
𝛾𝑎,𝑏   = two-disjoint path reliability coefficients         
𝛼𝑎, 𝛽𝑏   = reliability coefficients for each disjoint path        
 
 
 
 
I.Introduction 
HE aircraft’s Electric Power Distribution System (EPDS) is a network that provides electrical power from the 
onboard sources (engine-driven generators, back-up systems, ground supplies, etc.) to the loads. These loads comprise 
all of the devices or sub-systems that provide essential functionality for performing a safe flight. It is expected that on 
the More Electric Aircraft (MEA) an important percentage of the power demand, including propulsion systems [1], 
will be fed completely by electricity [2], thus increasing the number of electrically powered devices. With the 
increasing trend to replace hydraulic and pneumatic systems with electromechanical counterparts on-board [3], EPDS 
is expected to support an extensive number of configurations based on a larger utilization of power electronics [4] for 
an increasing number of loads with higher power demands. Certainly, the EPDS will play a vital role in the future 
aircraft performance and safety. Safety being the paramount attribute for airworthiness qualification in the aerospace 
industry, it is necessary to investigate the reliability of novel EPDS paradigms and topologies. While it is crucial to 
provide redundant circuits to feed critical loads when failures occur, it is also important to present an efficient and 
cost-effective solution. Currently, the standard defined by the aircraft manufacturers guides the conceptual design of 
an EPDS. This practice has led the subsystem and component suppliers to locally design through a separate 
optimization approach that is not necessarily optimal with respect to the EPDS network level [5]. The aim of this work 
is to present an optimization-based design framework that has the potential of synthesizing a MEA EPDS architecture 
such that it complies with a set of safety specifications to supply critical loads under failure conditions (representing 
a set of requirements from the standard). The performance evaluation of the potential MEA EPDS is reliability-
centered (using reliability metrics for both components and system) and the selection of the optimal EPDS candidate 
relies on the reliability’s impact on system’s weight and cost. Given recent interest in Mixed Integer Linear 
Programming (MILP) techniques in other microgrids [6] and transportation electrification problems [7], [8] due to 
their global-optimum convergence and quicker solving times when compared to other solvers handling the hard-to-
solve non-linear version of the problem, MILP is adopted in the design framework. The proposed framework will 
address an investigation of reliability-based design formulations for the synthesis of MEA EPDS architectures 
considering the main aerospace drivers, i.e. safety, cost, weight, and efficiency. This approach pretends to extent the 
few contributions available combining a design framework with MILP reliability-centered optimization. Although 
MILP is not necessarily unusual in the design of electrical systems in other applications, it is particularly new for the 
MEA application. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Literature review in MEA EPDS design is presented 
T 
in Section II. Then, Section III will introduce the EPDS design problem whilst depicting the main implications and 
difficulties. Later, Section IV will propose an optimization based decomposition method to synthesize an EPDS. This 
is followed by a linear transformation in Section V needed for solving the problem efficiently. In Section VI, the 
proposed method will be used to synthesize a MEA EPDS that satisfies a set of reliability specifications; these EPDSs 
will be assessed in terms of the main aerospace drivers. Finally, the paper will come to a conclusion in Section VII. 
II. Literature Review  
Until recently EPDS designs were typically based on a conventional design flow with a mixture of engineering 
expertise, practical experience, and general logic. Due to the growth in complexity of power requirements on MEA 
EPDS and its multi-disciplinary interactions with other aircraft’s systems, the design process demands new 
alternatives over the intuitive expertise of designers to make the initial down-selections and define a design space that 
is tractable [9].  Following this route, more research has been focused on the design framework proposals [10]–[13], 
architecture investigation and analysis [14]–[16], EPDS performance evaluation with analytical or simulation 
techniques [14], [17], [18], optimization-based design models [5], [19]–[21], or a combination of approaches including 
some forms of design methodology, performance evaluation, and optimal selection [15], [16]. However, MEA EPDS 
design is still at an early stage and few methodologies in the architecture synthesis direction have been explored.   
Among the design frameworks that have been applied to the design of new MEA EPDS architectures there are: 
Cyber-Physical System [10], [22]–[24], Platform Based Design (PBD) [13], [25], Integrated Design by Optimization 
[20], [26], and the optimization-based Extended Pareto Front Method [5]. Several contributions have been devoted to 
the study of MEA EPDS as a Cyber-Physical System, whose concept envisions the integration of computation, 
communication, control, and sensing technologies [22]. With the introduction of new syntaxes [27] and domain-
specific language [24] to satisfy the operational requirements of a MEA EPDS [23], the architecture design of a Cyber-
Physical MEA EPDS is possible having developed proficiency in new methods [11], control techniques [28], 
toolboxes [24], [29], [30], and their integration. These techniques and tools have introduced a set of systematic steps 
to manage complexity and requirements satisfaction. In regards to architecture design, the Cyber-Physical framework 
shares with other frameworks a consistent use of optimization routines, with special attention to MILP [7], [10]. Given 
a set of functional and reliability specifications, PBD incorporates optimization including Correct by Construction 
[31], and Contract based Design [10] methods. The latter synthesizes an EPDS by iteratively solving an algorithm 
motivated on a MILP modulo theory [32], where the number of constraints increases on every iteration depending on 
the satisfaction of the reliability requirements. On the other hand, based on the impact analysis of aerospace drivers, 
Correct by Construction divides the design process into a number of abstraction levels (platforms) and refinement 
steps that are solved sequentially. There are as many refinement steps as number of platforms until the latest 
abstraction level is close enough to the physical implementation [13]. In the case of MEA, an EPDS platform is a 
shared set of common design, engineering, and production efforts, as well as major components over a number of 
distinct models and types of MEA, often from different but related structure (network). In addition, platforms eliminate 
large loop iterations and restrict the design space via new structures that provide some design potential for lower cost 
[33]. The number of intermediate platforms is the essence of PBD and facilitate higher-level optimization. Following 
the spirit of PBD, this paper presents a design framework that relies on a MILP reliability-based network design which:  
 Ensures compliance with a set of reliability requirements by introducing reliability performance constraints 
in the MILP optimization, that is, performance evaluation is included as design conditions.  
 Searches over a design space determined by a set of functional (operational) constraints and major 
components in order to reach a high-level optimum, that is, system’s investigation and analysis is 
performed during the optimization itself. 
 Reduces the necessity of integrating several computational toolboxes and other analytical resources to 
search the design space and produce a MEA EPDS architecture.            
The key EPDS components that define a MEA platform include generation system, power distribution system, and 
electrical loads. Depending on their desired performance under several conditions (e.g. overloads, harmonics content), 
sizing of the EPDS components requires some iterations within the aerospace system engineering. The method 
proposed could potentially mitigate the number of these iterations through earlier abstraction of functionalities (via 
constraint additions) thus leading to an accelerated design by identification of optimal options. Recent reports have 
investigated the selection of optimal MEA EPDS [16], [34]–[37], while others have highlighted the importance of 
architecture synthesis through optimization of reliability, weight, and cost [4], [20], [38]–[40]. For the purpose of 
assessing reliability, it is vital to translate the safety specifications into a precise set of reliability constraints that 
accomplishes the expected performance. In a previous investigation [41], a reliability approach for the MEA EPDS 
design was explicitly formulated as an optimization problem with reliability constraints. Essentially, critical loads 
which are crucial for flight tasks must be powered at all times and must have alternative power supply routes in case 
of failure events in EPDS components. This feature has been extensively studied in network design [42]–[48]. In order 
to increase reliability, the designer allocates enough spare capacity such that there are sufficient backup routes to 
deliver power to prevent critical loads from suffering a power interruption. Therefore, network design techniques can 
then contribute to efficiently modelling and solving an optimization problem for the MEA EPDS synthesis. It is also 
possible to improve reliability by considering disjoint-paths for power delivery [48], so that supply on critical loads is 
not interrupted after failure occurs on an active path. An EPDS can also be designed to ensure power availability on 
critical loads in the event of component failures [45], connection failures [47], or general failure scenarios [46]. In this 
case, the system is said to be resistant to failure or resilient [47]. Also, when critical loads are still powered and an 
EPDS is able to perform its function under a failure scenario, the system is said to be survivable [46]. Resiliency will 
be modelled within the design formulations in order to achieve high power availability.     
III. Aircraft Power System Design Framework   
A MEA EPDS generates and distributes electrical power on-board. The design of such an EPDS has a large number 
of degrees of freedom. For instance, given a certain MEA application, several design requirements on physical 
implementation arise: number of power sources, type of power generation, power train configurations, number of 
different voltage levels, operational values for the different voltage levels, type of distribution (radial, ring, primary 
and secondary, etc.), number and type of power converters, technology for power conversion, power conversion 
switching frequencies, and many other factors that are also related to EPDS’s performance (e.g. transient dynamics 
response, harmonic content, etc.). Certainly, the solution to this design problem is far from trivial (design challenge). 
Even if a design formulation could be produced, its search space will be prohibitively large due to a combinatorial 
explosion between all of the technical and economic factors influencing the EPDS’s construction, which will make 
finding an optimum extremely hard. Thus, it is necessary to adopt a design framework that allows efficient design-
space exploration and an optimum identification and selection. 
A. The MEA EPDS Design Challenge  
In the construction of a MEA EPDS, it is necessary to optimize weight (at minimum cost) while maximizing 
efficiency and reliability, hence, it can be a multi-objective problem. The system’s reliability is determined by the 
availability of electrical power at the load’s terminals. This reliability is enhanced by establishing alternative power 
paths to make the system resilient and supply critical loads at all times (non-critical loads can be shed if required), 
which introduces a combinatorial process in the problem formulation. Besides, on-board power generation is usually 
sized according to the maximum load demand and resiliency to failure of one power source, but sizing could include 
temporal overloads, demand profiles (data models), dynamic response and stability, etc., which introduces interaction 
of other phenomena and disciplines in the problem. Considering that generator’s weight and efficiency is only 
influenced by its size as shown in Fig. 1 [49], these characteristics become conflicting optimization objectives: larger 
but lighter generators could run inefficiently most of the time if compared to a heavier system of several generators 
running either at maximum efficiency or turned off.  
 
Fig. 1 Aircraft AC synchronous generator’s weight and efficiency (left); simple MEA EPDS (right)  
Later, the power distribution network should provide several alternate paths to ensure power availability to the 
loads, which is finally a MEA EPDS resilient architecture. On top of previous complications to formulate the design 
problem, there is a main difficulty in synthesizing such an EPDS: assessing its reliability is a hard problem to solve. 
In fact, the EPDS reliability depends on the number of all the possible ways to supply the loads. For example, given 
the simple EPDS architecture shown in Fig. 1, if both loads were critical, a reliability evaluation technique such as the 
path-tracing method would deal with a number of 𝑛𝐿 = 16 possible paths to supply the loads [𝑛: ways to supply loads, 
𝐿: number of loads]. If 𝑛 = 6 and 𝐿 = 8 (not even a medium sized system yet), an exhaustive evaluation would explore 
more than 1.5 million combinations! To overcome this, the design framework proposed introduces resiliency 
characteristics (alternative paths) which prevents combinatorial explosion. To the best of our knowledge, similar 
approaches have not been applied to the MEA EPDS architecture synthesis application.      
B. MEA EPDS Design Framework   
We aim to construct a MEA EPDS that is able to satisfy the demand of a pre-determined group of electrically-
driven loads even under component-failure conditions. In general, the EPDS can be built by selecting and connecting 
a group of power generation and distribution components (topology synthesis). Given a set of power sources (e.g. 
generators, batteries, energy storage systems, etc.) and distribution components (e.g. rectification or inversion units, 
transformers , cyclo-converters, buses, etc.), the problem is to determine which power sources should supply which 
loads through which distribution devices, such that all loads are supplied at the reliability level required. Hence, EPDS 
design requires a selection process to decide which components are required, e.g. by adopting a set of Boolean values 
(0 or 1) to include or not each components/connections in the EPDS. Beyond these selection variables, other decision 
variables might be used to decide over continuous parameters (sizing), e.g. nominal rating of power sources and 
converters, power supplied by generators and converters, etc. Commonly, EPDS design requires the definition a priori 
of certain application-dependent aspects that will limit the search space to some extent. This delimitation will confine 
components into a library (template or graph) from which a number of components and feasible connections between 
them will be chosen. This library constitutes the platform of the corresponding abstraction level.         
 In this paper, the MEA EPDS design space is explored by evaluating the four main aerospace industry drivers 
(which are also design variables), i.e. cost 𝐶, weight 𝑊, efficiency 𝜂, and reliability 𝑟. To do so, it is compelling to 
observe the following relations between 𝐶, 𝑊, 𝜂 and 𝑟 in the aircraft industry [31]:  
 The number of generators and their power ratings drives the trade-off between cost and efficiency 
 The reliability performance of the EPDS is assessed as the availability of power at loads’ terminals  
 The cost of power distribution is driven by the generator-load combination and the topology of the EPDS  
 The weight of the power conversion is driven by a power density (kW/kg) and the amount of power to 
convert, thus, it is independent from the generator-load combination  
The above points represent the insights to redefine the MEA EPDS design. Given these insights, EPDS generation 
and distribution is amenable to be designed sequentially by adopting a PBD-inspired methodology. Through a series 
of refinement steps between abstracted platforms, PBD can implement a MEA EPDS architecture [50]. The proposed 
framework is depicted in Fig. 2, where the MEA design challenge (left) is undertaken by the design framework 
proposed (right) with the help of the aircraft industry’s insights. The resultant platform is a synthesized MEA EPDS 
Architecture.     
 Fig. 2 MEA EPDS Design Framework; design challenge (left), framework proposal (right)  
The design exercise starts with a set of design specifications and requirements. After abstracting the intermediate 
platforms based on the aerospace industry insights and the disruptive platforms envisioned for MEA [2], [4], [16], 
[51] (see Fig. 2 POWER GENERATION SYSTEM or Platform A, and DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM or Platform B), a MEA EPDS 
architecture can be synthesized (Platform C). Each refinement step between any two platforms demands a reliability-
based design optimization to ensure performance compliance at an optimum 𝐶, 𝑊, 𝜂 and 𝑟. The POWER GENERATION 
SYSTEM platform (Platform A) solves for the optimal amount, size, and assignment of generated power to the loads 
(load allocation). This platform uses some abstraction from the distribution system (Platform B) to provide a generator-
load path. Then, the DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (Platform B) is refined into an optimal EPDS network which finally forms, 
with the optimal power generation system of Platform A, the MEA ARCHITECTURE or Platform C. This architecture 
can be consecutively refined until the MEA EPDS can be implemented on a real MEA aircraft. However, the final 
implementation is out of the scope of this paper. Whenever the design specifications change, it is possible to adapt the 
proposed framework with new constraints or intermediate abstractions, so that it can fit in the aerospace system design 
iterations. The refinement between Platform A and B is known as Generation Selection and Generator-Load Pairing 
(GS&GLP step), and the refinement between Platform B and C is known as Power Distribution Design (PDD step). 
The former, explained in Section IV.B, will determine the number of generators, their ratings, and the generator-load 
pairs arrangement, while the latter, detailed in Section IV.C, builds a EPDS topology with the previous step’s solution 
[31]. 
IV. Formulation for the Design of Aircraft Power System  
The MEA EPDS architecture (Platform C in Fig. 2) consists of a group of interconnected generators and 
distribution components that supply power to the loads through several paths to provide resiliency. Synthesizing such 
an EPDS from scratch requires the utilization of decision variables to select and determine a series of parameters to 
allow generation and distribution. Concerning the selection process, Boolean decision variables (1 if selected, 0 
otherwise) will determine which components or connections are selected. For example, a binary variable 𝑔𝑗 (0 for no, 
1 for yes) can determine whether generator 𝑠 is selected, the existence of a connection from 𝑖 to 𝑗 can be determined 
by a binary variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗  (or 𝑦𝑗𝑖  for the reverse connection, set to 1 if the connection exists or 0 otherwise), and similarly 
with the rest of the distribution components. On the other hand, continuous decision variables could be used to 
determine the system’s performance, i.e. cost 𝐶, weight 𝑊, efficiency 𝜂, reliability 𝑟, and other parameters, i.e. power 
flow 𝑃𝑖𝑗  over connection 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , etc. In some cases, these performance indicators and parameters are functions of decision 
variables, e.g. cost 𝐶 could be function of 𝑔𝑗, 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑟, and 𝑃𝑖𝑗 , weight 𝑊 might be function of 𝑔𝑗, 𝑦𝑖𝑗 , and 𝑃𝑖𝑗 , and 
generation efficiency may be a function of power rating and loading, etc. In most cases, these functions are non-linear 
(see 𝜂 in Fig. 1) or deserve a time-consuming evaluation (as in the case of system’s reliability, see Fig. 1). A general 
formulation that pursue a design goal may include: (1) optimization of 𝐶, 𝑊, 𝜂 and 𝑟, (2) power balance, and (3) 
achievement of a certain reliability target. This formulation is compactly written below.   
minimize 𝐶, 𝑊   &   maximize 𝜂, 𝑟                                                                                                 (1.1)  
subject to   𝑃GENERATORS =  𝑃LOADS +  𝑃LOSSES                                                            (1.2) 
𝑟 ≥ 𝑟TARGET                                                                                  (1.3) 
 The optimization goals in (1.1) are conflicting, and the reliability in (1.3) depends on the specific combination of 
system components chosen and the way in which they are arranged, which is a huge number of combinations. Given 
the difficulties in solving formulation (1.1)-(1.3), the design framework in Fig. 2 (Section III) is applied.   
C. Generator selection and generator-load pairing (GS&GLP) step 
 The GS&GLP step attempts to select a number of generators, determine their ratings (sizing), and allocate a set of 
loads to each generator, i.e. produce a set of generator-load pairs which meet the loads’ demand and reliability 
requirements. An example of such an assignment is shown in Fig. 3. From a library of available generators and feasible 
connections forming a template in Fig. 3(a) (Platform A in Fig. 2), the GS&GLP step produces the solution shown in 
Fig. 3(b) (the optimum of the first refinement step); a template is a graph 𝒢 = {ℊ, ℰ} where ℊ is the set of generators 
(1 to 4 in this case), and ℰ is the set of generator-load connections (1 to {L1, L2}, 2 to {L1, L3}, etc.) which are referred 
as distribution paths for the rest of the paper. These distribution paths will be later refined in the PDD step.  
 
(a)                                                                                          (b) 
Fig. 3 GS&GLP problem (a) template; (b) power ratings and pairing arrangement  
 
 The GS&GLP problem can be formulated as the minimization of all 𝑤𝑠 (generator 𝑠 weight) and the maximization 
of all 𝜂𝑠 (generator 𝑠 efficiency). It will be assumed that cost is directly proportional to weight, hence weight 
minimization is equivalent to cost minimization (𝐶 ∝ 𝑊). Let the selection of a generator 𝑠 be performed using a 
Boolean 𝑔𝑠 (1 if 𝑠 is selected, 0 if not). Also, let this generator have a power rating 𝑃𝑠
𝐺  and be connected to a load 𝑙 
with demand 𝐿𝑙; the connection between generator 𝑠 and load 𝑙 can be represented by Boolean 𝑦𝑠𝑙  (1 if connection 
exists, 0 if not). The total power supplied by generator 𝑠 is ∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙𝑠  and its loading factor 𝛽𝑠 is ∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙𝑠 /𝑃𝑠
𝐺 . Recalling 
that 𝑤𝑠 can be considered as a function of 𝑃𝑠
𝐺  and nominal speed (RPM), and that 𝜂𝑠 can be expressed as a function 
of 𝑃𝑠 and 𝛽𝑠 (see Fig. 1), then the GS&GLP problem can be written as in (2.1). The product of 𝑤𝑠 and 𝜂𝑠 by 𝑔𝑠 in (2.1) 
allows to set weight and efficiency of generator 𝑠 to 0 when it is not selected.   
min
𝑤,𝜂,𝑔,𝑦
(∑ 𝑤𝑠𝑔𝑠
𝑠
) , max
𝑤,𝜂,𝑔,𝑦
(𝜂1𝑔1) , max
𝑤,𝜂,𝑔,𝑦
(𝜂2𝑔2) , … max
𝑤,𝜂,𝑔,𝑦
(𝜂𝑠𝑔𝑠)                                   (2.1) 
       The result of (2.1) comprises the selection of generators 𝑔𝑠, their power ratings 𝑃𝑠
𝐺 , and the generator-load pairs 
𝑦𝑠𝑙  (or distribution paths). In specific applications, several technical aspects are decided a priori, e.g. operating speed, 
type of electrical machines (e.g. PMSM), geared or non-geared powertrain, maximum number of generators, etc. 
Along with (2.1), a set of connectivity and reliability constraints are included. Connectivity ensures power balance, as 
in (1.2). The reliability constraints ensure required power availability at load terminals. An EPDS’s reliability will 
depend on the reliabilities of the generators ( 𝑟𝑠), and the reliability of the distribution paths. The former are frequently 
available from manufacturers’ datasheets. However, the latter is unknown at this stage. To overcome this uncertainty, 
the distribution system will be depicted as a virtual system 𝑉𝑆 (containing the set of 𝑦𝑠𝑙 distribution paths) whose 
reliability 𝑟𝑉𝑆 can now be specified in three ways: 1) as a lower boundary 𝑟𝑉𝑆 (a minimum reliability will be assumed 
to be achievable in the PDD step), 2) as a single variable 𝑟𝑉𝑆, or 3) as a set of variables 𝑟𝑠𝑙  (one for each 𝑦𝑠𝑙). In any 
case, for a load connected to a generator 𝑠, the reliability can be written as in (2.2):  
𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑠 ≥ 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙                                                                                                  (2.2)  
The left-hand side of (2.2) is the reliability of a series system assuming independent components’ reliabilities. 
Furthermore, a load which is connected to different generators through independent paths, would be powered unless 
all generators/paths fail, a probability which can be expressed as in (2.3):  
1 − ∏(1 − 𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑠)
𝑠
≥ 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙                                                                       (2.3) 
That is, (2.3) is the reliability of a parallel-series system. The optimal solution for the GS&GLP comprises:  
 A group of selected generators (⊆ ℊ) with their corresponding ratings 𝑃𝑠
𝐺  
 A set 𝐾 containing the group of selected connections 𝑦𝑠𝑙  (each 𝑦𝑠𝑙  supplies load 𝑙 from generator 𝑠), i.e. 𝐾 =
{𝑘1, 𝑘2, … } for which 𝑦𝑠𝑙 = 1, where 𝑘 represents a selected distribution path 𝑦𝑠𝑙, and 𝐾 ⊆ ℰ     
 The reliability of the distribution system, either as 𝑟𝑉𝑆, 𝑟𝑉𝑆, or a set of 𝑟𝑠𝑙  (one per selected 𝑦𝑠𝑙).  
 The optimal GS&GLP solution is used in the PDD step (next refinement step) explained below.  
D. Power Distribution Design (PDD) step 
Considering the synthesized optimal power generation system (Platform A in Fig. 2) from the previous GS&GLP 
refinement step, the PDD step attempts to find a topology for the MEA EPDS such that the resultant platform is the 
MEA EPS architecture (Platform C in Fig. 2), which is the object of investigation in this paper. Hence, PDD selects a 
group of distribution components and connections to construct or refine the distribution paths of the GS&GLP step. 
The PDD problem can also be formulated as (1.1). Following the 𝐶 ∝ 𝑊 assumption, PDD refinement step can be 
expressed as a cost minimization problem subject to connectivity and reliability constraints.  
Consider a template represented with a graph 𝒢 = {𝒩, 𝒜} where 𝒩 is a set of distribution devices (converters, 
buses, etc.), and 𝒜 is a set of connections (conductors, contactors, etc.) between components in 𝒩, see Fig. 4(a). Let 
a connection between components 𝑖, 𝑗 exist if a Boolean 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is set. Also, let a component 𝑖 be selected if a Boolean 𝑣𝑖 
is set. The distribution system’s total cost comprises a fixed cost (e.g. installation cost) and a variable cost that depends 
on the amount of power transferred. Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗  have a fixed cost 𝑐𝑖𝑗, a variable cost 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑊, and a power flow 𝑃𝑖𝑗  that is the 
summation of all existing power flows 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 per distribution path 𝑘, i.e. 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 . Similarly, let 𝑣𝑖 have a fixed 
cost 𝑚𝑖, a variable cost 𝑚𝑖
𝑘𝑊, and a power flow 𝑃𝑖  which is the summation of all transferred power flows 𝑃𝑖,𝑘 per 
distribution path 𝑘, i.e. 𝑃𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 . The distribution system’s fixed cost is the summation of all the connection’s 
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 and all the component’s 𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖 fixed costs. The variable cost is proportional to the amount of power transferred 
through connections (𝑃𝑖𝑗) and components (𝑃𝑖), ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑘∈𝐾  and ∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑘𝑘∈𝐾  respectively. Hence, the variable cost for 
connections is 𝑐𝑖𝑗
kW(∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 ) and the variable cost for components is 𝑚𝑖
kW(∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 ). Then, the total cost of the 
distribution system can be written as in (3.1).  
min
𝑃,𝑥,𝑣
∑ (𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗
kW (∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
))
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜
+ ∑ (𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖
kW (∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
))
𝑖∈𝒩
                                      (3.1) 
𝑃𝑖,𝑘 can be defined as the summation of all the power from incoming (or outgoing) connections, i.e. 𝑃𝑖,𝑘 = ∑ 𝑃𝒿𝑖,𝑘𝒿 , so 
that all connections and components’ power flows can be represented with 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 flows. The reader can refer to Fig. 
4(b) for the relations between 𝑃𝑖𝑗 , 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘, 𝑃𝑖,𝑘, and the distribution path 𝑘. The variable cost can be thought of a 
proportional cost that depends on the size of the system (which depends on the amount of power transferred). 
Therefore, connections and components are sized accordingly (e.g. conductor gauge, converter size). Alternatively, 
𝑐𝑖𝑗  can include both component cost and connection cost, thus eliminating the 𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖 term in (3.1). This simplification 
is viable when modularity is required, e.g. addition of customized converters with swappable boards whose number 
of boards depends on the power requirements, bus-bars systems, etc.    
         
(a)                                                                                 (b) 
Fig. 4 PDD problem (a) template; (b) detail example of power flows on a section of the EPDS  
 
Following (1.1), efficiency might be included in (3.1). The EPDS distribution’s efficiency depends mainly on the 
type of power conversion technology and other implementation factors, e.g. equipment location, load type, etc. In the 
PDD platform, power conversion functional model relies on the voltage step-up/down for a certain power transmission 
whose weight depends on a power density figure. Further refinement steps are needed so that the abstraction of 
efficiency-related functional specifications are possible and power conversion topologies are explored [52], hence,  
efficiency is deferred for future research works. A group of constraints on connectivity, flow balance (1.2), and 
reliability are added to (3.1). Assuming independent failure events, with 𝑟𝑖𝑗  denoting the reliability of the 𝑖, 𝑗 
connection and 𝑟𝑖 the reliability of component 𝑖, the 𝑘 distribution path’s reliability is the reliability of a series system:  
( ∏ 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑗|(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑘
) (∏ 𝑟𝑖
𝑖∈𝑘
) ≥ 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘                                                                 (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) contains of all the components and connections that form the path 𝑘. The reliability target 𝑟TARGET,𝑘 of 
the distribution path 𝑘 in (3.2) must match the reliability of the distribution system found in the GS&GLP step, that 
is, 𝑟TARGET,𝑘 (equal to 𝑟𝑉𝑆, 𝑟𝑉𝑆, or 𝑟𝑠𝑙). If (3.2) is unable to meet 𝑟TARGET,𝑘, an expression to allow alternative paths is 
required. The addition of alternate paths increases the system’s reliability and incorporates resiliency in the EPDS. 
Considering a number of 𝓌 alternate independent paths that connect the generator and load of the distribution path 
𝑘, the reliability can be calculated as the left hand side of (3.3), which must exceed some minimum value 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘  .  
1 − ∏ (1 − ( ∏ 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑗|(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝑘
) (∏ 𝑟𝑖
𝑖∈𝑘
))
𝓌
≥ 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘                              (3.3) 
The higher the number of alternative paths, the higher reliability is obtained, at the cost of increasing the size of the 
system. Hence, there is a compromise between reliability, cost, and weight in the PDD step that leads to a trade-off. 
The number of alternate routes can be determined either by strengthening the EPDS for a set of failure scenarios, e.g. 
prepare for all single-component failures, or building disjoint alternative paths [48], [53] for powering critical loads. 
While the former requires the incorporation of a failure set, the intention of the latter is to increase the probability that 
at least one path delivers power to critical loads. Thus, the reliability constraints in (3.2)-(3.3) will be reformulated to 
perform a reliability-based or resilient network design. The resilient network design aims to synthesize a resilient 
EPDS architecture and could be used for obtaining the trade-off between reliability, cost, and weight. 
Summarizing this section, a PBD-inspired design framework is used to solve (1.1)-(1.3) in two steps: GS&GLP 
(2.1)-(2.3) and a PDD (3.1)-(3.3). The formulations given for the GS&GLP and PDD refinement steps are non-linear 
and hard to solve. Therefore, in the following section we propose a linear transformation (linearization) to produce a 
MILP formulation that can be solved in polynomial time (in terms of number of variables and constraints) by a MILP 
solver, to reach guaranteed optimality.    
V. Linear Transformation of EPDS Design   
In order to avoid the use of heuristic techniques [48], [53], decrease the optimization complexity, and utilize an 
off-the-shelf MILP-solver, linearization techniques based on discretization, piecewise linear functions, and other 
equivalent linear models are used to solve the non-linear formulations in the GS&GLP and PDD refinement steps.    
E. Generator selection and generator-load pairing 
The GS&GLP problem in (2.1) is non-linear and multi-objective: total weight minimization and efficiency 
maximization for each generator. One alternative to linearize (2.1) consists in reformulating it as a linear combination 
of objectives. In this case, each objective has an importance determined by coefficients 𝑎1, 𝑎2,…, 𝑎𝑛. In addition, 
efficiency 𝜂𝑠 is expressed in terms of losses (𝜂𝑠
LOSS) to allow the optimizer to minimize total generation losses; the 
reader is referred to Appendix 1 for obtaining 𝜂𝑠
LOSS from 𝜂𝑠. Then, (2.1) can be written as:      
min
𝑤,𝜂,𝑔,𝑦
∑(𝑎1(𝑤𝑠𝑔𝑠) + 𝑎2(𝜂𝑠
LOSS𝑔𝑠))
𝑠
                                                                                           (4.1) 
Equation (4.1) still contains non-linear products of continuous (𝑤𝑠, 𝜂𝑠
LOSS) and Boolean (𝑔𝑠) variables. To deal 
with this, it is possible to discretize 𝑤𝑠 and 𝜂𝑠
LOSS (the optimizer will search over a finite set of values). An advantage 
of discretizing 𝑤𝑠 is that commercial values (discrete generator sizes) could be used. In discretization, only one of the 
possible values must be selected (unique value). Let a Boolean 𝑢𝑠ℎ select a unique value for the power rating 𝑃ℎ
𝐺  and 
weight 𝑤ℎ of generator 𝑠, and let another Boolean 𝑧𝑠𝑏 select a unique generation loss 𝜂ℎ𝑏
LOSS and supply power ?̂?ℎ𝑏
𝐺  that 
correspond to the selected 𝑃ℎ
𝐺 . In this case, ∑ 𝑢𝑠ℎℎ = 1,  ∑ ∑ 𝑧𝑠ℎ𝑏𝑏ℎ = 1 so that generator 𝑠 has only one value on 
each of its parameters 𝑃ℎ
𝐺 , 𝑤ℎ , 𝜂ℎ𝑏
LOSS and ?̂?ℎ𝑏
𝐺 . 𝑤𝑠 is now a vector of ℎ different values 𝑤ℎ, and 𝜂𝑠
LOSS is a replaced with 
a vector of 𝑏 different loadings 𝜂ℎ𝑏
LOSS corresponding to the rating ℎ. Then, (4.1) can be rewritten as:     
min
𝑢,𝑧,𝑦
∑ (𝑎1 (∑ 𝑤ℎ𝑢𝑠ℎ
ℎ
) + 𝑎2 (∑ ∑ 𝜂ℎ𝑏
LOSS𝑧𝑠ℎ𝑏
𝑏ℎ
))
𝑠
                                                              (4.2) 
     𝑤𝑠 and 𝜂𝑠
LOSS can also be approximated by piecewise linear functions (PWL). PWL places a linear segment between 
a pair of discrete values, thus, the optimal solution can take an intermediate values. Solvers could handle convex 
functions (𝑤𝑠, 𝜂𝑠
LOSS) with less work than non-convex functions (convexity is a degree of the function’s curvature and 
discontinuity). Now, connectivity and reliability constraints will be added to (4.2). Each generator must have a unique 
rating (or power rating = 0 if generator is not chosen), then  
∑ 𝑢𝑠ℎ
ℎ
≤ 1                                                                                                    ∀𝑠            (4.3) 
Within rating in (4.3), a unique generation loss value must be selected (or 0 if generator is not chosen):  
∑ 𝑧𝑠ℎ𝑏
𝑏
≤ 𝑢𝑠ℎ                                                                                        ∀𝑠, ∀ℎ            (4.4) 
A load 𝑙 can be connected to generator 𝑠 only if that generator is selected (4.5).  
𝑦𝑠𝑙 ≤ ∑ 𝑢𝑠ℎ
ℎ
                                                                                          ∀𝑙, ∀𝑠            (4.5) 
The total load power cannot exceed the selected generator rating 𝑃ℎ
𝐺  for any generator (4.6); similarly, the total load 
power cannot exceed the generator’s supply power ?̂?ℎ𝑏
𝐺  (considering losses) (4.7)   
∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙
𝑙
≤ ∑ 𝑃ℎ
𝐺𝑢𝑠ℎ
ℎ
                                                                                 ∀𝑠            (4.6) 
∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙
𝑙
≤ ∑ ∑ ?̂?ℎ𝑏
𝐺 𝑧𝑠ℎ𝑏
𝑏ℎ
                                                                       ∀𝑠            (4.7) 
Note that the supply power ?̂?ℎ𝑏
𝐺  depends on 𝛽𝑠. Lastly, (4.8) ensures each load is connected at least to one generator.  
∑ 𝑦𝑠𝑙
𝑠
≥ 1                                                                                                    ∀𝑙            (4.8) 
 The reliability constraints in (2.2)-(2.3) are now linearized. By taking the logarithm of the product in (2.2) and 
(2.3), a summation results. Then, this summation is a linear reliability constraint that can be solved in two ways 
depending on the value of the distribution system’s reliability. Recalling that the distribution system’s topology is 
unknown at this stage, its reliability can be assumed to be 𝑟𝑉𝑆 (achievable lower boundary), or it can be introduced as 
a variable (single variable 𝑟𝑉𝑆 for whole distribution system, or set of variables 𝑟𝑠𝑙  for each distribution path) [8]. For 
the former, the reliability constraint is written as (4.9).  
∑ 𝑦𝑠𝑙 ln (1 − 𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑠)
𝑠
≤ ln(1 − 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙)                                            ∀𝑙            (4.9) 
     where 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙  is the reliability target for load 𝑙. Note that each term ln (1 − 𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑠) is constant, therefore (4.9) is 
linear. For the latter, the reliability of the distribution system (𝑟𝑉𝑆, or the set 𝑟𝑠𝑙) replaces 𝑟𝑉𝑆 in (4.9). However, this 
reliability is now a variable that falls inside the logarithm and requires further linearization (a variable inside a 
logarithm is a non-linear expression). Similarly to 𝑤𝑠 and 𝜂𝑠
LOSS, we can discretize 𝑦𝑠𝑙 ln(1 − 𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑠) into a set of 
possible reliability values 𝑟𝑠𝑜
𝐸  (subscript 𝑜 accounts for the discretized values of ln(1 − 𝑟𝑉𝑆𝑟𝑠)). Then, (4.10) and (4.11) 
are the reliability constraints when the reliability of the distribution system is a variable. In (4.10), only one reliability 
will be selected by setting a Boolean 𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑜
𝑆 , such that  ∑ 𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑜
𝑆
𝑜 = 1 if 𝑦𝑠𝑙  is selected, otherwise 0. Finally, (4.11) ensures 
at least 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙  is achieved on each load 𝑙, allowing it to be connected to multiple generators.       
∑ 𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑜
𝑆
𝑜
≤  𝑦𝑠𝑙                                                                                       ∀𝑠, ∀𝑙         (4.10) 
∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑠𝑜
𝐸 𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑜
𝑆
𝑜𝑠
≤  ln(1 − 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙)                                                      ∀𝑙         (4.11) 
Summarizing the linearization of the GS&GLP step, (2.1) is converted in the linear combination of objectives of 
(4.1). Because (4.1) is still non-linear due to the product of variables, it is linearized by using discretization in (4.2). 
The constraints (4.3)-(4.8) are linear and ensure connectivity between generators and loads. Finally, the reliability 
constrains in (2.2)-(2.3) are linearized to (4.9) if distribution system’s reliability is assumed as a lower boundary, or 
(4.10)-(4.11) if the distribution system’s reliability is a variable to solve for. Constraints (4.9), (4.10)-(4.11) allows a 
load 𝑙 to be supplied by multiple generators, thus providing resiliency when a generator fails. In the next section the 
linearization of the formulations in the PDD step will be detailed. 
F. Power Distribution Design 
The PDD’s objective in (3.1) is already linear, so the connectivity and reliability constraints can be considered. 
Power flow balance is enforced on every component 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 by summing all incoming and outgoing power flows with 
its own generation power and load demand (if they exist). Incoming flows and load demand are considered positive, 
while outgoing flows and generation power are considered negative. Given the solution of the GS&GLP step, each 
distribution path 𝑘 will have to satisfy the load demand 𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷  by supplying a generation power 𝑑𝑘
𝐺𝐸𝑁. For the 
generator-load pair of the distribution path 𝑘, 𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 = 0 in the generator, 𝑑𝑘
𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0 on the load, and 𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 = 𝑑𝑘
𝐺𝐸𝑁 =
0 for the rest of the components forming the path. Incoming power flow from any component 𝑗 to component 𝑖 is 
denoted 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘, while outgoing power flow from 𝑖 to any other component 𝑗 is denoted as 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘  Flow balance constraint 
is then,   
 ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑖|(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜
− ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑖|(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜
+ 𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 − 𝑑𝑘
𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0                 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                 (5.1) 
For any components 𝑖, 𝑗 the power flow 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑘  flows in the 𝑖 → 𝑗 direction. However, it is possible to have flow in opposite 
direction by defining two variables for the same connection between 𝑖, 𝑗 (such that only one can be positive at once) 
allowing power flow to be reversed, e.g. recovering energy in regeneration modes. The connection from 𝑖 to 𝑗 can 
only be selected if these components have both been selected, then,    
𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑖                                                                   ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩                  (5.2) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑗                                                                   ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝒩                  (5.3) 
Constraints (5.4)-(5.5) ensures that power 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 through any connection 𝑖, 𝑗 and power through any component 𝑖, can 
only flow if connection 𝑥𝑖𝑗  or component 𝑥𝑖 have been selected . For the rest of the paper, the required flow along the 
distribution path 𝑘 is 𝑑𝑘, such that 𝑑𝑘 = |𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷|, for notation simplicity.  
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 ≤ 𝑑𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑗                                                            ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                 (5.4) 
∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑗∈𝒩
≤ 𝑑𝑘𝑥𝑖                                                              ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                (5.5) 
The reliability constraint for the distribution system in (3.2) contains products and is non-linear, thus, logarithms can 
be used for linearization. Constraint (3.2) also requires a subset of connections and components to form the distribution 
path 𝑘. Due to the fact that connection 𝑥𝑖𝑗  and component 𝑥𝑖 can be used for more than one distribution path 𝑘, 
Boolean variables 𝓏𝑖𝑗,𝑘 and 𝓏𝑖,𝑘 are used to determine if 𝑥𝑖𝑗  and 𝑥𝑖 are being used for distribution path 𝑘 once 
connection 𝑥𝑖𝑗  and component 𝑥𝑖 have been selected respectively. Then, 
𝓏𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑖                                                                          ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                (5.6) 
𝓏𝑖𝑗,𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑖𝑗                                                                       ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                (5.7) 
Similarly to (5.4)-(5.5), constraints (5.8)-(5.9) enforce no power flow (related to distribution path 𝑘) in component 𝑖 
or connection 𝑖, 𝑗 if the component and connection have not been reserved for that distribution path 𝑘, hence,    
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 ≤ 𝑑𝑘𝓏𝑖𝑗,𝑘                                                             ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                (5.8) 
∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑗∈𝒩
≤ 𝑑𝑘𝓏𝑖,𝑘                                                               ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                (5.9) 
Now, assuming a single path (series system), the reliability constraint in (3.2) can be linearized as in (5.10) by taking 
the natural logarithm of both sides. The reliability of each distribution path 𝑘 must be at least equal to the reliability 
target 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘 . 
∑ 𝓏𝑖𝑗,𝑘 ln(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
𝑗|(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜
+ ∑ 𝓏𝑖,𝑘 ln(𝑟𝑖)
𝑖∈𝒩
≥ ln(𝑟TARGET, 𝑘)                  ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾              (5.10) 
Lastly, (5.11) limits the power flow through connection 𝑖, 𝑗 and component 𝑖 to their maximum 𝑃𝑖𝑗
MAX and 𝑃𝑖
MAX.  
0 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
≤ 𝑃𝑖𝑗
MAX                                                ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                (5.11𝑎) 
0 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
≤ 𝑃𝑖
MAX                                                        ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                (5.11𝑏) 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑘 = ∑ 𝑃𝒿𝑖,𝑘𝒿 . The integrality {0,1} on the Boolean variables used in this section can be written as, 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝓏𝑖𝑗,𝑘 , 𝓏𝑖,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                             ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾               (5.12) 
 The PDD non-linear formulation of (3.1)-(3.2) has been converted into a MILP formulation in (3.1), (5.1)-(5.12).  
Other constraints can be added to this MILP formulation to satisfy specific needs, e.g. restrict components’ power or 
cable sizes [44]. Given that (5.10) assumes a series system (single path) for the distribution path 𝑘, resiliency 
formulations will be introduced in order to provide multiple paths as proposed in (3.3). These approaches are known 
as resilient network designs [47]. 
Resilient design for a set of failure scenarios   
 
 If a failure event occurs in any component 𝑖 of the distribution path 𝑘, the single path breaks, the critical load is 
disconnected, and the reliability in (5.10) is no longer preserved. Therefore, a resilient design that produces a failure 
resistant system is required. Let 𝐹 be the set of failure scenarios comprising connection failures [47] and/or component 
failures [46] that the system is expected to survive. The EPDS must continue supplying critical loads if any of the 
failure scenarios of the set 𝐹 occurs (failure events in 𝐹 are assumed to be independent). Hence, the flow balance in 
(5.1) applies to every failure scenario. The connection flow 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 is now the maximum of all the power flows existing 
on every failure scenario 𝒻 of the set 𝐹, i.e. 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = max
𝒻
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝒻
, where 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝒻
 is the flow on connection 𝑖, 𝑗 for the failure 
scenario 𝒻 and distribution path 𝑘. Considering the set 𝐹 of failure scenarios, flow balance can be written as,  
∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝒻
𝑗|(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜
− ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝒻
𝑗|(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜
+ 𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 − 𝑑𝑘
𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0               ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝒻 ∈ 𝐹          (6.1) 
 Let 𝒻𝑖𝑗  represent the existence of a failure in connection 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , then 𝒻𝑖𝑗 = 0 for no failure, and 𝒻𝑖𝑗 = 1 if failure 
occurs. Power flow along connection 𝑖, 𝑗 is guaranteed if, for the failure scenario 𝒻, this connection has not failed 
(𝒻𝑖𝑗 = 0), otherwise, power flow is 0, then,  
         𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝒻
 ≤ 𝑑𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝒻𝑖𝑗)                                         ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝒻 ∈ 𝐹          (6.2) 
Finally, constraint for 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 (maximum of all 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝒻
) is (6.3), and integrality on Boolean variables can be written in (6.4).   
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = max
𝒻
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝒻
                                                                 ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾          (6.3) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1}                                                                                            ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜          (6.4) 
The resilient network design for a set of failure scenarios is the MILP formulation (3.1), (6.1)-(6.4). It is possible 
to consider component selection by adding (5.2)-(5.5), and (5.11). Although the determination of an exhaustive failure 
set (all possible failures) could be cumbersome because of the large number of components/connections and 
simultaneous failure combinations, it is possible to determine a partial failure set, e.g. limited number of hazardous 
events that could compromise critical functions. At this point, it might be desirable to have an alternative if no set 𝐹 
of failure scenarios could be determined. This situation could be found when considering disruptive designs with 
experimental technologies. In these cases, there is limited information on the failure modes of the system because 
technology can be at the prototype level (likely to happen in MEA). Hence, in addition to the resilient design for 
failure scenarios, a two-disjoint path formulation will be introduced.  
Resilient design with two-disjoint paths   
 
The distribution path 𝑘 has an alternate path to transfer power flow in case there is a failure on any 
component/connection that interrupts power supply. In this case, both paths are considered disjoint because the failure 
on one of them must not limit the capacity of the other. It is possible that the alternate path supplies power from a 
different generator or power source (auxiliary unit, storage device, etc.). In most cases, both paths do not share the 
same components and connections in order to manage failures on any component of the first (or second) path. This 
approach is known as the two-disjoint path problem [53]. Distjointness refers to the use of different connections and 
components for each path, such that the probability that at least one path survives is increased.  
Let 𝑞 be the disjoint-path index, i.e. 𝑞 ∈ {1,2}. When connection 𝑖, 𝑗 is selected, it can either allow power flow for 
the first or the second disjoint-path, thus 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑞=1 = 0 or 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑞=2 = 0. Similarly, when component 𝑖 is selected, it can either 
transfer power for the first or second disjoint-path, i.e. ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑞=1
𝑗∈𝑁 = 0 or ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑞=2
𝑗∈𝑁 = 0. Let the Boolean 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘 and 
𝓊𝑖,𝑘 select which disjoint-path is the connection 𝑖, 𝑗 and component 𝑖 reserved for. The connection disjointness can be 
established as follows,    
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑞=1 ≤ 𝑑𝑘𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘                                                          ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜         (7.1𝑎) 
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑞=2 ≤ 𝑑𝑘(1 − 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘)                                              ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜         (7.1𝑏) 
Boolean 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘 reserves power flow 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑞
 for disjoint-path 1 or 2 only (not both) because either 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 0 or 1 − 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘 =
0. Similarly, the component disjointness can be established as,  
∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑞=1
𝑗∈𝒩
≤ 𝑑𝑘𝓊𝑖,𝑘                                                            ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩         (7.2𝑎) 
∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑞=2
𝑗∈𝒩
≤ 𝑑𝑘(1 − 𝓊𝑖,𝑘)                                              ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩         (7.2𝑏) 
Boolean 𝓊𝑖,𝑘 reserves component’s power flow for disjoint-path 1 or 2 (not both) because either 𝓊𝑖,𝑘 = 0 or 1 −
𝓊𝑖,𝑘 = 0. Now, the power flow balance must be established for every disjoint-path 𝑞, thus, it can be written as:  
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑞
𝑗|(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜
− ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑘
𝑞
𝑗|(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜
+ 𝑑𝑘
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷 − 𝑑𝑘
𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0               ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑞 ∈ {1,2}          (7.3) 
If 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is set, 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑘,𝑝
 is allowed to flow on either disjoint-path according to (7.4).  
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑞 ≤ 𝑑𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑗                                                                     ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, 𝑞 ∈ {1,2}           (7.4) 
The integrality constraints on the Boolean 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘 and 𝓊𝑖,𝑘 are shown below. 
𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘, 𝓊𝑖,𝑘 ∈ {0,1}                                                                ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩           (7.5) 
The reliability of two disjoint paths can be obtained using the probability of the occurrence of any two events, that is 
P(𝑎 ∪ 𝑏) = P(𝑎) + P(𝑏) − P(𝑎 ∩ 𝑏), and for independent events P(𝑎 ∩ 𝑏) = P(𝑎)P(𝑏). Let 𝑟𝑘
𝑞
 be the reliability of 
the disjoint-path 𝑞, then, the probability that at least one path survives must at least reach target 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘 ,   
𝑟𝑘
𝑞=1 + 𝑟𝑘
𝑞=2 − 𝑟𝑘
𝑞=1𝑟𝑘
𝑞=2 ≥ 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘                                                        ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾           (7.6) 
For the calculation of each disjoint-path’s reliability 𝑟𝑘
𝑞
, (5.10) suffices (reliability of a single path, series system). 
Considering (5.10), the product of the disjoint-paths’ reliabilities in (7.6) produces an extensive series of products 
between variables. In order to avoid performing linearization on each of these products, a simpler approach to represent 
the disjoint-path’s reliability is introduced. Let a set of variables 𝓈𝑖,𝑘
𝑞
 be defined as the probability of power 
successfully reaching component 𝑖 (starting at the generator) when component 𝑖 is reserved for disjoint-path 𝑞 (recall 
that distribution path 𝑘 consists in two disjoint-paths). Then, 𝓈𝑖,𝑘
𝑞
 is,   
𝓈𝑗,𝑘
𝑞 ≤ 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖𝓈𝑖,𝑘
𝑞 + (1 − 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘)                              ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑞 ∈ {1,2}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜           (7.7) 
If component 𝑖 is selected, 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 1 and 𝓈𝑗,𝑘
𝑞 ≤ 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑖𝓈𝑖,𝑘
𝑞
; otherwise (7.7) relaxes 𝓈𝑗,𝑘
𝑞
 to an arbitrary value if component 
𝑖 is not selected, i.e. 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘 = 0.  For the generators, 𝓈𝑗,𝑘
𝑞
 is,   
𝓈𝐺𝐸𝑁,𝑘
𝑞 = 1                                                                                   ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑞 ∈ {1,2}           (7.8) 
When (7.7) is applied to the load of the distribution path 𝑘, 𝓈𝑗,𝑘
𝑞
 is the probability of successfully reaching the load and 
𝓈𝑗,𝑘
𝑞
 can be written as 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞
. Then 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞
 is the reliability of the disjoint-path 𝑞, so that 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞 = 𝑟𝑘
𝑞
. Now, 
considering the variables 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞
, the constraint on the reliability of the two disjoint-paths (7.6) can be rewritten as,  
𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=1 + 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=2 − 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=1 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=2 ≥ 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘                                     ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾           (7.9) 
The values of 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=1
 and 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=2
 in (7.9) could be identical. This could originate an algorithmic issue known as 
symmetry problem, which can produce high computational effort during MILP optimization. To break the potential 
symmetry problem in (7.9), an additional constraint is introduced to speed up MILP optimization,    
𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=1 ≥ 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=2                                                                                             ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾         (7.10) 
With this approach, only one product in (7.9) requires linearization (unlike the extensive series of products in (7.6)). 
An alternative to the linearization of 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=1 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=2
 is to express (7.9) as a group of linear constraints that select a 
value for the left hand side of (7.9) directly. Allow each 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞
 to be discretized in a vector containing the disjoint-
path’ reliability values, i.e. 𝛂 = [𝛼1 … 𝛼𝑎] and β = [𝛽1 … 𝛽𝑏] for 𝑞 = 1 and 𝑞 = 2 respectively. Also, allow a matrix 
𝚪 [𝑎 × 𝑏] have elements 𝛾𝑎,𝑏 such that 𝛾𝑎,𝑏 = 𝛼𝑎 + 𝛽𝑏 − 𝛼𝑎𝛽𝑏. Let a Boolean ℴ𝑎𝑏,𝑘 select a unique value for 𝛾𝑎,𝑏, 
then, constraint (8.1) ensures that only one element 𝛾𝑎,𝑏 from the matrix 𝚪 is selected 
 ∑ ∑ ℴ𝑎𝑏,𝑘𝑏𝑎 = 1                                                                                            ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾            (8.1) 
The two path reliability constraint in (7.9) can be written as,  
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑎,𝑏ℴ𝑎𝑏,𝑘
𝑏𝑎
≥  𝑟TARGET, 𝑘                                                                      ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾            (8.2) 
A condition for (8.1) and (8.2) is that a unique value for each disjoint path’s reliability (𝛼𝑎 and 𝛽𝑏) must be selected. 
For the disjoint path 𝑞 = 1, such a condition can be written as,  
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑎−1ℴ𝑎𝑏,𝑘
𝑏𝑎
≤ 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=1 ≤ ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑎+1ℴ𝑎𝑏,𝑘
𝑏𝑎
                                 ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾            (8.3) 
Similar constraint for 𝑞 = 2 can be written by replacing 𝛼𝑎 with 𝛽𝑏 and 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=1
 with 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞=2
; 𝛼𝑎−1 and 𝛼𝑎+1 act as  
an upper and lower values for 𝛼𝑎. A drawback of this approach is the large number of ℴ𝑎𝑏,𝑘 variables if higher accuracy 
were required. In (8.2), 𝛾𝑎,𝑏  could be stuck around 𝑟TARGET, 𝑘  even when the disjoint paths’ reliabilities are higher. To 
prevent this, an additional term in the optimization objective is needed to push 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞
 to its actual value. This term 
should be comparatively small with respect to total cost to avoid biasing cost optimization. Then,   
min
𝑃,𝑥,𝑠,𝑢
∑ (𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐kW
𝑖𝑗 (∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
))
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜
+ ∑ (𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖 + 𝑚kW
𝑖 (∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑘
𝑘∈𝐾
))
𝑖∈𝒩
− ∑ ∑ 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞
𝑞𝑘∈𝐾
              (9) 
 
Briefing of the MILP resilient design formulations 
This section concludes the MILP reliability based network design formulations for the synthesis of MEA EPDS 
architectures following a PBD-inspired framework. The EPDS design has been split into two steps: GS&GLP and 
PDD. In the GS&GLP, a group of power sources or generators are selected, sized, and assigned to the loads. Then, 
this optimum is used to synthesize a topology for the EPDS in the PDD step. In order to increase power availability 
in the loads, resiliency was introduced in the MILP formulations of GS&GLP and PDD. In PDD, resiliency was 
appointed by designing an EPDS that tolerates the occurrence of failures, either by preparing the system for a set of 
pre-defined failure scenarios or providing two-disjoint paths for every distribution path. Specialized MILP solver 
packages will be used shortly to synthesize a MEA EPDS architecture in the case study of the next section.      
VI. Case Study 
 The purpose of this case study is to exemplify the design framework presented in Section III by applying the 
reliability-based MILP formulations of Section V in the synthesis of a MEA EPDS architecture. Although there are 
an important number of MEA applications (electric propulsion, turbo-electric, etc.) and EPDS network structures (DC, 
AC, AC & DC, single bus, ring, etc.), we provide a complete design assessment for a small-aircraft MEA DC EPDS 
architecture so that the designer can perceive the potential of our design framework proposal for other applications. 
The technical considerations for the MEA EPDS design are detailed below.  
 The MEA EPDS structure will be based on a DC network with two voltage levels: a high-voltage (HV) level 
and a low-voltage (LV) level, because there are HV and LV loads. In its simplest structure, there are a number 
of source matrix contactor buses (bus bars) that distribute generation power, a number of power converters 
to transform power from HV to LV power, and a number of LV buses. This network structure has been 
studied in several publications as promising MEA EPDS [4], [16], [54]. Hence, following the design 
framework presented in this paper, the templates 𝒢 = {ℊ, ℰ} for the GS&GLP step and 𝒢 = {𝒩, 𝒜} for the 
PDD step are shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5 Templates for GS&GLP step (left), and PDD step (right)  
 
 A PMSM generator with a power density of 7.0 kW/kg is assumed to be available. This assumption is in 
accordance with the expected technology for low carbon MEA propulsion [55]. The number of generators 
will be arbitrarily limited to 5 considering the possibility of multiple small generators.        
 A power density of 6.7 kW/kg will be used for power electronic conversion [55] (assuming high power 
density SiC-based power electronics technology is available). The weight of power conversion is assumed to 
be proportional to the power flow transferred, and this flow is assumed to be proportional to the cost.  
 The case study is solved using a Windows High Spec PC Intel Xeon 64-bit 3.60GHz running CPLEX Studio 
IDE 12.9.0 [56].   
The MEA EPDS supplies power to a group of 4 loads which total demand is 125kW. The loads’ requirements (power 
demands and reliabilities) are shown in Table 1. This table is part of the initial design requirements. The reliability 
target is expressed as a probability, e.g. load 𝐿1 requires to be supplied (with generation power) with a probability of 
at least 1 − (1 × 10−9). Loads 𝐿1 to 𝐿3 are LV DC (low voltage), and 𝐿4 is the only HV DC load (high voltage).    
Table 1 Design requirements for on-board loads (Part I)  
Loads 
  𝐿1 𝐿2 𝐿3 𝐿4 
𝐿𝑙 [kW] 50 25 40 10 
1 − 𝑟TARGET,𝑙   1.0 × 10
−9 1.0 × 10−6 1.0 × 10−6 1.0 × 10−6 
 
 The reliability targets in Table 1 are accompanied by a set of functional specifications, in this case, resiliency 
requirements. In addition to setting 𝐿1 as the only critical load because it has the lowest probability of failure (of not 
being supplied) and determine the optimal MEA EPDS architecture for this application, we propose an extended set 
of resiliency requirements in Table 2 to illustrate the potential of the design framework.       
Table 2 Design requirements for on-board loads (Part II)   
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Formulation Single path Design for a Failure Set Two Disjoint Path 
Critical  
loads  
N/A All 1, 3 1, 3 1, 3 4 1, 4 All 1, 3 1, 4 4 2, 3 2, 4 1 
Failure set 
𝐹 
- 
Conv. 
& HV 
box 
Conv. 
Conv. 
& LV 
bus 
N-1 
HV 
box 
Conv. 
& HV 
box 
- - - - - - - 
MILP 
Optimization 
objective 
(3.1) (3.1) (9) 
MILP 
Constraints  
(5.1) to 
(5.12) 
Critical loads: (6.1), to (6.4) 
Non critical loads: (5.1) to (5.12) 
Critical loads: (7.1) to (7.5), (7.7)-(7.8), (7.10), (8.1)-(8.3) 
Non critical loads: (5.1) to (5.12)  
 
  
 There are 13 additional scenarios to the single path formulation (scenario 1). The scenarios 2-7 require some loads 
to be critical and the distribution system to be resilient over a set of failures, e.g. scenario 4 defines load 1 and 3 as 
critical and its EPDS must be prepared for single failures in any power converter or LV buses. In the case of scenario 
5, N-1 means that the EPDS is resilient under any single failure of any component. Likewise, the scenarios 8-14 
require some loads to be critical, but for those critical loads there will be two-disjoint paths to be supplied while the 
non-critical loads are supplied through single paths. The MILP optimization objective and constraints in Table 2 refer 
to the optimization formulations of the PDD step. To begin with, the GS&GLP step is performed shortly.           
 
 
Generator selection and generator-load pairing  
 The generator’s rating power is in the range 25kW – 150kW (a small aircraft has ~300kW per engine) and its 
loading will be restricted to 40% minimum to avoid very low efficiencies. The weight of the generators is inversely 
proportional to the power density, then 𝑤𝑠 ∝
1
7 𝑘𝑊/𝑘𝑔
 or 𝑤𝑠 ∝ 0.1428𝑃𝑠
𝐺. An efficiency function 𝜂𝑠 relating power 
rating 𝑃𝑠
𝐺 and loading 𝛽𝑠 is approximated to be able to select generators of different sizes and loadings. The generator’s 
cost to weight ratio is 870£/𝑘𝑔 and a reliability of  1 − 1.0 × 10−5 is considered for all the generators. The power 
distribution reliability is considered to be in the range of 0.9000 – 0.9997. The power generation system design 
specifications for the GS&GLP step (generation system platform abstraction) are tabulated in Table 3.  
Table 3 Power Generation System platform abstraction for GS&GLP   
Generators 
 
𝑃𝑠
𝐺[kW], 𝛽𝑠[p.u.] 𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑁 = 25, 𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐴𝑋 = 150;   𝛽𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑁 = 0.4, 𝛽𝑠
𝑀𝐴𝑋 = 1.0  
𝑤𝑠(𝑃𝑠
𝐺) [kg] 12.2 + 0.1428𝑃𝑠𝐺  
𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠) [%]  
22.09 + 0.2563𝑃𝑠
𝐺 + 95.23𝛽𝑠 − 0.0004374(𝑃𝑠
𝐺)2 − 0.1324𝑃𝑠
𝐺𝛽𝑠 − 40.46𝛽𝑠
2 
Approximated function for values of 𝑃𝑠
𝐺 ∈ [𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑁, 𝑃𝑠
𝑀𝐴𝑋]  
𝜂𝑠
LOSS(𝑃𝑠
𝐺 , 𝛽𝑠) [%]  𝑃𝑠
𝐺𝛽𝑠(100(𝜂𝑠
−1(𝛽𝑠)) − 1)  
Cost (given 𝑤 ∝ 𝑐) 870 £/𝑘𝑔 
1 − 𝑟𝑠  1.0 × 10
−5 
𝑟𝑉𝑆 [0.9000 , 0.9997]       or     1 − 𝑟𝑉𝑆:  [1.0 × 10
−1, 3.0 × 10−4] 
  
 The GS&GLP problem is solved considering the load requirements of Table 1 and the platform abstractions of 
Table 3. The optimization objective of the GS&GLP is (4.2) (with weighting coefficients 𝑎1 = 𝑎2), the connectivity 
constraints are (4.3)-(4.8), and the reliability constraints (resiliency) are (4.10)-(4.11). Then, in simplified notation,   
min ∑(𝑎1(generator weight𝑠) + 𝑎2(generator loss𝑠))
𝑠
 
subject to:              (4.3) to (4.8), (4.10) to (4.11) 
The optimization selects a group of generators (with minimum weight and losses) such that connectivity and resiliency 
constraints are satisfied. The results of the GS&GLP step are presented in Table 4. Three generators out of five were 
selected and the total generation capacity is 300kW. Also, 9 out of 20 distribution paths were selected. Given that the 
reliability requirements of the loads (Table 1) are high, all loads are connected to two generators at least (𝐿1 is 
connected to all 3 generators), so generation capacity is more than double.     
Table 4 GS&GLP solution for a MEA EPDS design  
 𝐺1 𝐺2 𝐺3 𝐺5, 𝐺6 
𝑃𝑠
𝐺  (kW) 125 50 125 Not selected 
Loads served {𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3, 𝐿4 } {𝐿1} {𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3, 𝐿4} -- 
Set 𝐾 𝑦11, 𝑦12, 𝑦13, 𝑦14 𝑦21 𝑦31, 𝑦32, 𝑦33, 𝑦34 -- 
Reliability 𝑟𝑠𝑙  of 
the distribution 
path 𝑘   
1 − 𝑟11 = 1.6 × 10
−3 
1 − 𝑟12 = 1.6 × 10
−3 
1 − 𝑟13 = 6.0 × 10
−4 
1 − 𝑟14 = 6.0 × 10
−4 
1 − 𝑟21 = 1.0 × 10
−3 
1 − 𝑟31 = 6.0 × 10
−4 
1 − 𝑟32 = 6.0 × 10
−4 
1 − 𝑟33 = 1.6 × 10
−3 
1 − 𝑟34 = 1.6 × 10
−3 
-- 
 
 The optimal solution of the GS&GLP is used in the PDD step to refine the distribution paths (build a power 
distribution topology). The reliabilities 𝑟𝑠𝑙  of each path are used as reliability targets in the PDD step.      
Power Distribution Design  
Recall that there are three types of distribution components considered in the EPDS network structure: HV Source 
Matrix Contactor (HV box), HV/LV DC converters, and LV DC bus. The Source Matrix Contactor (HV box) allows 
power generation transfer without cross-connecting generators. The HV/LV DC converters are assumed to be of the 
dual active bridge type (DAB) and can be connected to more than component in both sides. The LV buses can 
distribute power to multiple loads from more than one HV/LV DC converter. The power density (𝑝. 𝑑.), weight 
(𝑤𝑖𝑗 , 𝑤𝑖), fixed costs (𝑐𝑖𝑗 , 𝑚𝑖), variable costs (𝑐𝑖𝑗
kW, 𝑚𝑖
kW)  reliability (𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑖𝑗), and maximum power for all connections 
𝑖, 𝑗 and all type of components is shown in Table 5. The power density of the HV/LV converters is 6.7 kW/kg as 
previously stated. Although the characteristics for the connections 𝑖, 𝑗 require the definition of voltage values, 
conductor types, insulation types, etc., the values shown in Table 5 are assumed for illustration purposes.     
Table 5 Power Distribution platform abstraction for PDD   
Power 
distribution 
 
  HV DC sw. box Converters LV DC buses Connections (𝑖𝑗) 
𝑝. 𝑑. [kW/kg] 8.0 6.7 14.5 25.5 
𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 [kg]  1.8 8.5 1.8 0.2 
𝑚𝑖
kW, 𝑐𝑖𝑗
kW
 [k£/kW] 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.05 
𝑚𝑖, 𝑐𝑖𝑗 [k£]  12 48 12 1 
𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑖𝑗   5.0 × 10
−6 1.0 × 10−4 5.0 × 10−6 2.0 × 10−6 
𝑃𝑖
MAX, 𝑃𝑖𝑗
MAX [kW] 500 800 500 1000 
 
Considering the optimal solution of the GS&GLP step shown in Table 4, the MILP formulations presented in 
Section V.D are used to synthesize a MEA EPDS architecture considering the platform abstractions of Table 5. Several 
scenarios (consisting in different design requirements) were proposed in Table 2 and these options are explored in this 
case study for the synthesis of resilient distribution architectures.  
The set 𝐾 of distribution paths connecting generators and loads (GS&GLP optimal solution in Table 4) are divided 
into two subsets: one that contains generators supplying non-critical loads (𝐾𝑁𝐶), and other that contains generators 
supplying critical loads (𝐾𝐶). Therefore, connectivity and resiliency constraints applied on distribution paths differ 
depending on the critical load combination, as shown in the scenarios of Table 2. The power flow 𝑃𝑖𝑗  in any connection 
𝑖, 𝑗 consists in the summation of the power flows from distribution paths supplying critical and non-critical loads.  
Scenario 1 (single path) results in the EPDS’s topology of Fig. 6(a). The generators supply the LV DC loads by 
the series system HV box – HV/LV Converter – LV bus, in other words, each distribution path supplying LV DC 
loads use the same series system (𝐿4 is supplied by HV box). Fig. 6(b) illustrates the distribution paths (set 𝐾).    
     
(Sc. 1)                                                   (distribution paths visualization)                         
Fig. 6 MEA EPDS architecture with single path formulation or Scenario 1 (a) EPDS; (b) visualization of the 
distribution paths (generator-load pairs) of Table 4 (𝑮𝟏 𝐭𝐨 {𝑳𝟏, 𝑳𝟐, 𝑳𝟑, 𝑳𝟒}, 𝑮𝟐 to {𝑳𝟏}, 𝑮𝟑 to {𝑳𝟏, 𝑳𝟐, 𝑳𝟑, 𝑳𝟒}) 
 
Note that if a failure occurred in any component of the EPDS in Fig. 6(a), power supply to LV DC loads is cut. 
Given the lack of alternative paths to distribute power to the loads in the Scenario 1 in Fig. 6, resilient designs are 
used. The resilient designs for a failure set corresponds to the formulations in Scenarios 2 to 7 of Table 2, while the 
resilient designs with two disjoint paths-corresponds to the formulations in Scenarios 8 to 14.  
The EPDS’s topologies that result from the synthesis of resilient designs for a failure set (Scenarios 2 to 7 of Table 
2) are shown in Fig. 7 (critical loads are solidly colored, non-critical loads have no fill). Each failure case is determined 
by row Failure set 𝐹 of the corresponding column of Table 2. Conv., HV box, and LV bus refer to single failures in power 
converters, HV boxes, and LV buses respectively. The failures are modelled by determining which connections 𝑖𝑗 are 
active and which are not. Each case of the set 𝐹 has 48 𝒻𝑖𝑗  elements (there are 48 possible connections 𝑥𝑖𝑗  according 
to template 𝒢 in Fig. 5) such that 𝒻𝑖𝑗 = 1 for failed connection 𝑖, 𝑗. Then, a failure in a component 𝑖 is determined by 
setting all incoming and outgoing connections as failed, that is, 𝒻𝑗𝑖 = 𝒻𝑖𝑗 = 1 for all the components 𝑗 that are 
connected to component 𝑖. Depending on the set 𝐹, the number of selected components varies.  
 
(Sn. 2)                   (Sn. 3)                    (Sn. 4)                 (Sn. 5)                 (Sn. 6)                 (Sn. 7)  
Fig. 7 Optimal MEA EPDS architecture for resilient requirements (failure-resistant)  
In Scenario 2, the failure set 𝐹 contains 8 possible failure in distribution components: single failure on HV/LV 
converters (4 in total), and single failure on HV boxes (4 in total). That is why it has the largest number of HV boxes 
and HV/LV converters. In all cases where failure on HV/LV converter is considered (Scenarios 2-7 except 6), the 
EPDS topology has at least 2 converters (redundant converters). The scenarios where failures on HV box are not 
considered (3 and 4), there is only one HV box (see Fig. 7(b) and (c)). Scenario 2 in Fig. 7(a) (all loads are critical) is 
the heaviest and most expensive option, yet there is only one LV bus because failures in LV buses where not 
considered. The lightest (cheapest) EPDS is the Scenario 6 (Fig. 7(e)) which considers failures in HV boxes only. This 
EPDS is appropriate if the HV loads (𝐿4 in this case) are the only critical loads. In the cases where LV loads are 
critical, (𝐿1 and 𝐿3 on Scenarios 2 to 5 and 7), weight and cost can be reduced with respect to the topology in Fig. 
7(a). In general, some weight (and cost) savings are possible depending on the critical load combination and the pre-
defined failure set 𝐹 (different design requirements).  
When a failure set cannot be determined, a resilient design with two disjoint-path formulations for critical loads 
can be used. The MEA EPDS topologies synthesized with two disjoint path formulations are presented in Fig. 8.    
 
(Sn. 8)               (Sn. 9)               (Sn. 10)               (Sn. 11)              (Sn. 12)              (Sn. 13)              (Sn. 14) 
Fig. 8 Optimal MEA EPDS architecture for resilient requirements (two-disjoint path) 
The two disjoint-path formulation allows the synthesis of an EPDS architecture consisting of two components of 
each type in all Scenarios of Fig. 8 (except Scenario 11 in Fig. 8(d)) because there is at least one LV load that is 
critical. The disjointness caused by 𝓊𝑖𝑗,𝑘, 𝓊𝑖,𝑘 in (7.1)-(7.2) allows the existence of separate distribution paths, i.e. two 
paths of the form HV box–HV/LV converter–LV bus for the critical LV loads, and two paths with different HV boxes 
to supply critical HV loads (only where 𝐿4 is critical, Scenarios 8, 10, 11, and 13). The reliability 𝓈𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐷,𝑘
𝑞
 of each path 
has been determined with the linear transformation of (8.1)-(8.3). Similarly to the architectures in Fig. 7, some critical 
load combinations allow weight and cost savings without compromising the resiliency of the system. The lightest 
(cheapest) option can be obtained by setting HV loads as the critical loads, as illustrated in Fig. 8(d) (Scenario 11). 
For the rest of the cases where LV loads are critical, the system’s cost is increased.  
 A summary of the results in terms of cost, weight, efficiency -losses-, and reliability for each of the EPDS Scenarios 
of Table 2 is presented in Table 6. This table also tabulates the solving time for comparison purposes. Additionally, a 
graphical comparison to illustrate the potential of the proposed design framework to elaborate trade-off analysis 
between cost, weight and reliability for all scenarios of Table 2 is presented in Fig. 9. For each scenario, there is a line 
that connects the largest and lowest reliability provided by the optimal architecture.  
  
Fig. 9 Trade-off between cost, weight, and reliability for optimal MEA EPDS architectures 
Given that cost is considered proportional to weight, the main trade-off analysis can be conducted with the cost 
vs. reliability (failure probability to supply loads) of Fig. 9. For instance, below a cost of ~500k£, a MEA EPDS 
architecture is unable to achieve reliabilities below 1 − 1 × 10−11. However, most of the solutions provide at least a 
reliability between 1 − 1 × 10−8 and 1 − 1 × 10−4 in a specific load terminal. Based on the results presented in Table 
6 and Fig. 9, the following conclusive remarks apply:  
 In all cases, a minimum reliability level was achieved, i.e. 𝑟 ≥ 𝑟TARGET, 𝑙 as required by (1.3).  
 Although Scenario 1 achieves a minimum reliability at a minimum cost, no resiliency is provided.   
 In general, the EPDSs synthesized to overcome failures from a failure set have higher reliabilities than the 
EPDSs synthesized with two disjoint-path formulations. 
 The EPDSs built with two disjoint-paths have slightly higher costs compared to EPDSs synthesized from 
resilient designs for a failure set.  
 Scenarios 6, 11, and 13 are the most economical because the HV load (𝐿4) is set to be critical. HV loads 
requires no power conversion unlike LV loads which requires at least one power conversion stage.   
 Scenarios 7, 3, 4, 5, and 9 are the most economical in the case that a set of LV loads (𝐿1 and 𝐿3) are critical. 
The costs increase due to the power conversion stage required.  
 Scenario 14 has one critical LV load (𝐿1) and its topology’s cost is slightly less expensive than having two 
critical LV loads including 𝐿1, as in Scenario 9. However, the lower the power requirements of the LV loads, 
the lower the cost is, as can be seen from the results of Scenario 12.    
 The solving times of the resilient designs for a failure set are higher (on average) than the resilient designs 
with two-disjoint paths designs. This is due to the higher number of constraints per failure case. 
Lastly, there are number of opportunities with the optimal MEA EPDS architectures of Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. Because 
these optimal architectures were originated from different requirements established on Table 2, there is no further 
selection of an optimum but a careful assignment of any of these architectures to a MEA application that needs a 
specific performance. For instance, the topology of scenario 6 suits best when an HV load is critical and all the LV 
demand can be shed. The optimal architectures found in this paper resemble the results found in [10], [57] (topology 
optimization) and correspond to similar network structures found in [4], [16], [54]. However, the design framework 
presented allows the designer explore a design space and investigate the optimum EPDS for a set of requirements, or 
even perform a trade-off analysis for several sets of requirements, as evidenced in Table 6.  
In conclusion, the reliability based MILP network design formulations of Section V have been used to synthesize 
a MEA EPDS architecture for a small aircraft application. The design framework comprises two steps: GS&GLP and 
PDD. Although single path formulations complies with a minimum reliability, resilient formulations enable the EPDS 
to route power from generators to loads through alternate paths. Resilient designs for a failure set or two disjoint-path 
on critical loads were formulated. In addition to the load requirements, the EPDS architecture also depends on the 
resilient requirements and the critical load combination. Hence, an optimal EPDS’s architecture can fit a MEA 
application depending on the requirements. As a design exercise, Table 6 presents a solution palette for different 
scenarios of the case study. Loads that require no power conversion stages will contribute in having a lighter and more 
economical MEA EPDS, unlike the LV loads which add a higher number of components and consequently require a 
heavier (and costlier) EPDS. The design formulations presented in this paper allows the synthesis of more complex 
architectures, e.g. considering energy storage, different levels of load criticality, AC and DC conversions, several 
levels of power conversion, etc. Further refinement steps for defining distribution component technology selection 
and sizing will be explored in future research works.   
 Table 6 Case study results for the MEA EPDS architectures of scenarios on Table 2  
 
   Single 
Path 
Design for a failure set Two Disjoint Path 
  Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
  Formulation 
GS&GLP 
Optimization objective: (4.2), constraints: (4.3)-(4.8), (4.10)-(4.11) 
  Formulation 
PDD See Table 2 for the resilient design formulations 
  Critical loads N/A All 1, 3 1, 3  1, 3 4 1, 4 All 1, 3 1, 4 4 2, 3 2, 4 1 
  Failure case - 
Conv. & 
HV box 
Conv.  
Conv. & 
LV bus 
N-1 rule  HV box 
Conv. & 
HV box 
- - - - - - - 
    Fig. 5a 6a 6b 6c 7a 7b 7c 8a 8b 8c 8d 9a 9b 9c 
Generation capacity installed (kW) 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
               
Cost 
(k£) 
GS&GLP 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 69.1 
PDD 281.0 492.0 403.0 450.0 491.0 299.0 363.0 562.0 521.0 469.0 300.0 450.0 398.0 464.0 
 
Total cost (k£) 
 
350.1 561.1 472.1 519.1 560.1 368.1 432.1 631.1 590.1 538.1 369.1 519.1 467.1 533.1 
                
Weight 
(kg) 
GS&GLP 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 79.4 
PDD 151.5 220.4 196.8 221.6 250.3 154.66 170.2 302.98 273.5 237.5 156.9 223.3 187.4 233.3 
 
Total weight (kg) 
 
230.9 299.8 276.2 301.0 329.7 234.1 249.6 382.4 352.9 316.9 236.3 302.7 266.8 312.7 
Losses (kW) 
GS&GLP {20.96,   11.52,   20.96} 
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L1 
𝑟11 1.6e-3 1.2e-04 7.0e-06 1.4e-05 7.0e-06 1.3e-08 1.0e-04 7.0e-06 1.6e-08 1.0e-08 2.6e-08 1.2e-04 2.3e-04 2.3e-04 2.5e-08 
𝑟21 1.0e-3 1.2e-04 7.0e-06 1.4e-05 7.0e-06 1.3e-08 1.0e-04 7.0e-06 1.0e-08 1.6e-08 2.6e-08 1.2e-04 2.3e-04 2.3e-04 2.5e-08 
𝑟31 6.0e-4 1.2e-04 7.0e-06 1.4e-05 7.0e-06 1.3e-08 1.0e-04 7.0e-06 1.0e-08 2.6e-08 1.0e-08 1.2e-04 2.3e-04 2.3e-04 1.6e-08 
L2 
𝑟12 1.6e-3 1.2e-04 7.0e-06 1.4e-05 7.0e-06 1.3e-08 1.0e-04 7.0e-06 1.0e-08 2.3e-04 2.3e-04 1.2e-04 2.5e-08 1.0e-08 2.3e-04 
𝑟32 6.0e-4 1.2e-04 7.0e-06 1.4e-05 7.0e-06 1.3e-08 1.0e-04 7.0e-06 2.6e-08 2.3e-04 2.3e-04 1.2e-04 2.5e-08 4.0e-08 2.3e-04 
L3 
𝑟13 6.0e-4 1.2e-04 7.0e-06 1.4e-05 7.0e-06 1.3e-08 1.0e-04 7.0e-06 6.2e-08 1.6e-08 2.3e-04 1.2e-04 2.5e-08 2.3e-04 2.3e-04 
𝑟33 1.6e-3 1.2e-04 7.0e-06 1.4e-05 7.0e-06 1.3e-08 1.0e-04 7.0e-06 2.6e-08 1.6e-08 2.3e-04 1.2e-04 2.5e-08 2.3e-04 2.3e-04 
L4 
𝑟14 6.0e-4 8.9e-06 7.2e-16 7.0e-06 7.0e-06 8.1e-11 8.1e-11 8.1e-11 9.0e-11 8.9e-06 6.3e-11 7.2e-11 8.9e-06 4.5e-10 8.9e-06 
𝑟34 1.6e-3 8.9e-06 7.2e-16 7.0e-06 7.0e-06 8.1e-11 8.1e-11 8.1e-11 9.0e-11 8.9e-06 1.0e-10 1.0e-10 8.9e-06 1.0e-06 8.9e-06 
                
Solving 
Time 
(s) 
GS&GLP 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 
PDD 0.174 174.22 10.48 34.80 193.68 6.401 24.03 24.412 3.017 19.10 0.943 16.08 2.960 3.873 
 
Total solving time (s) 
 
0.796 174.84 11.102 35.42 194.30 7.023 24.652 25.034 3.639 19.722 1.565 16.702 3.582 4.495 
* Reliability as probability of failure 1 − 𝑟 
VII. Conclusion 
The synthesis of a MEA EPDS architecture has been proposed by employing a PBD-inspired design framework 
that relies on reliability based MILP network design formulations. The proposed design approach allows handling of 
the design’s complexity by dividing the architecture synthesis in two steps, Generator Selection & Generator-Load 
Pairing and Power Distribution Design, supported by the relation between weight, cost, efficiency, and reliability for 
aircraft electrical systems. These steps are solved sequentially using linearization techniques and MILP formulations 
that model resiliency in an efficient manner in order to satisfy the design’s reliability requirements. Resiliency is 
formulated as a group of constraints that ensure EPDS power availability in critical loads, either surviving a failure 
set or assigning two disjoint-paths for critical loads. A case study for a MEA application has shown that the optimal 
EPDS depends on the resiliency requirements and the critical load combination, from which several optimum 
architectures can be appropriately assigned to a MEA application that requires such performance and in some cases 
weight and cost reductions are possible. Future research will be committed to formulate further refinement steps to 
synthesize platforms from the optimal MEA architecture for closer implementation to an actual MEA EPDS. 
Appendix 
A generator’s efficiency 𝜂 can be written as a relation between its mechanical input and its electrical output.  
𝜂 =
output
input
=
output
output + losses
                                                                      (𝑖. 1) 
From the relationship above, the generator’s losses can be found:  
losses = output (
1 − 𝜂
𝜂
)                                                                                 (𝑖. 2) 
Let a generator 𝑠 have a power rating 𝑃𝑠
𝐺 , total supplied load of ∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙𝑙  (output), and a loading factor 𝛽𝑠 =
∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑠
𝐺 . 
The efficiency characteristic of this generator can be expressed either in terms of the power supplied (output) or its 
loading factor 𝛽𝑠 (see Fig. 1(b) in Section III). Considering an efficiency 𝜂𝑠 (in %) in terms of the generator’s loading 
factor 𝛽𝑠, the generator’s losses 𝜂𝑠
LOSS (in kW) can be written as:   
𝜂𝑠
LOSS = (∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙
𝑙
) (
100 − 𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
)                                                        (𝑖. 3) 
Rewriting the expression above in terms of the loading factor 𝛽𝑠, the losses are: 
𝜂𝑠
LOSS(𝑃𝑠
𝐺 , 𝛽𝑠) = 𝑃𝑠
𝐺 (
∑ 𝐿𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑠𝐺
) (
100 − 𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
) = 𝑃𝑠
𝐺𝛽𝑠 (
100 − 𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
)                     (𝑖. 4) 
The losses can also be expressed in percentage (%) of the power rating 𝑃𝑠
𝐺 ,   
𝜂𝑠
LOSS(𝛽𝑠)[%] = 100
𝜂𝑠
LOSS(𝑃𝑠
𝐺 , 𝛽𝑠)
𝑃𝑠𝐺
= 100
𝑃𝑠
𝐺𝛽𝑠
𝑃𝑠𝐺
(
100 − 𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
) = 100𝛽𝑠 (
100
𝜂𝑠(𝛽𝑠)
− 1)        (𝑖. 5) 
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